moonshadow0825 wrote: ↑Fri Aug 27, 2021 5:10 pm
um, that study was published in early December 2020, which means the data includes neither the 3rd wave nor the current delta wave both of which have been and are currently substantially more aggressive
and this one, while published in March 2021 is based on a the above study which as mentioned did not include the delta variant (dates indicated March 202 to Jan 2021)
actually the study you referenced indicated that the age group that had the highest admission to the ICU was 0-17 at 27.5%, the next highest group moving to the ICU were 50-64 year-olds. the 0-17 may have a lower overall mortality rate at 0.7% but they die sooner (within 10 days of admittance to the 16-19 days for older cohorts)
again, based on outdated and incomplete information.
once you factor in the delta variant the numbers change. when the projections for herd immunity and other "normalization" activities the delta variant didn't exist. According to the CDC the delta variant is 2x more infectious-
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-n ... iant.html
If there are no updated mortality estimates by age group for covid then these are just unsubstantiated claims. Let's also not forget most deaths counted under covid are also reported as having multiple co-morbidities so classification based on one root cause can be mistaken.
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covi ... EsoVV2Qs1Q
For over 5% of these deaths, COVID-19 was the only cause mentioned on the death certificate. For deaths with conditions or causes in addition to COVID-19, on average, there were 4.0 additional conditions or causes per death.
And then there's also the question of excess deaths and their cause, when it was highlighted that one third of excess deaths in the US between March and August last year were not caused by covid at all.
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articl ... y-covid-19
The researchers found a significant increase in recorded deaths from dementia and heart disease in March and April, for example. And in June and July, coinciding with the second surge in COVID-19 cases in some states, there was a second increase in deaths due to dementia.
Dr. Woolf believes that the pandemic may also have indirect effects on mortality rates in the longer term. Rates of preventable early deaths may increase in the coming years as a result of disruptions in chemotherapy for cancer and delays in routine mammogram screening for breast cancer, for example.
Beyond excess mortality rates, Dr. Woolf says, there may be additional lasting harm to health and well-being.
“Many people who survive this pandemic will live with lifelong chronic disease complications. Imagine someone who developed the warning signs of a stroke but was scared to call 911 for fear of getting the virus. That person may end up with a stroke that leaves them with permanent neurological deficits for the rest of their life.â€Â
As another example, he notes, diabetes complications that are not managed properly during the pandemic could lead to kidney failure.
Other health problems, such as emotional trauma, may also have gone untreated. Dr. Woolf says that he is particularly worried about the lasting psychological effects on children.
Seems to be plenty of ambiguity in what constitutes a covid death (I would assume the same could also be said for other causes of death as well) which is why it's easier just to look at the overall death rate to paint the "truest" picture if one was looking for a large death spike caused by a new variant or something of the like. And based on the statistics and raw data, I severely doubt there has been much movement in the overall covid death rate, otherwise we'd have seen a massive increase in annual death rates during 2020 and so far in 2021, which have remained relatively flat or continued their steady small yearly increase (largely due to the aging population).
Death rate (per 1,000) in Canada 2011-2020
2011: 7.25
2012: 7.28
2013: 7.30
2014: 7.38
2015: 7.47
2016: 7.55
2017: 7.63
2018: 7.71
2019: 7.76
2020: 7.80
10 year average annual increase: 0.06
2019-2020 increase: 0.04
Deviation from average: -0.02
(Sources:
-
https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/C ... death-rate
-
https://knoema.com/atlas/Canada/Death-rate
-
https://www.statista.com/statistics/443 ... in-canada/)
Death rate (per 1,000) in the USA 2011-2020
2011: 8.14
2012: 8.15
2013: 8.16
2014: 8.26
2015: 8.37
2016: 8.48
2017: 8.58
2018: 8.69
2019: 8.78
2020: 8.88
10 year average annual increase: 0.07
2019-2020 increase: 0.1
Deviation from 10-year average: +0.03
(Sources:
-
https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/U ... death-rate
-
https://knoema.com/atlas/United-States- ... Death-rate)
How about total hospitalization rates?
Hospitalization rate (per 100,000) in Canada 2011-2020
2010-2011: 8,343
2011-2012: 8,332
2012-2013: 8,203
2013-2014: 8,205
2014-2015: 8,083
2015-2016: 8,054
2016-2017: 7,980
2017-2018: 7,944
2018-2019: 7,883
2019-2020: 7,699
(Source:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/497 ... tion-rate/)
This recent conversation brings me back to another journal article I linked a while back regarding the potential damages of mass hysteria.
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/18/4/1376/html
Mass hysteria can have enormous public health costs in terms of psychological stress, anxiety, and even physical symptoms. To these costs must be added indirect adverse health effects from alcoholism, suicides, or damage from deferred treatment and delayed recognition of illness. Policy failures in mass hysteria can lead to economic decline and poverty, which in turn negatively impacts public health and life expectancy.
Studies of mass hysteria have mostly focused on outbreaks in localized settings of schools or businesses.
However, in the digital age of global mass and social media, the possibility of global mass hysteria exists, a phenomenon that has not yet been studied. Our study of the political economy of mass hysteria draws on the well-established psycho-logical phenomenon of mass hysteria and applies it to a new and innovative context of global mass hysteria for which no literature exists yet. More specifically, we analyzed how the political system can influence the likelihood and spread of mass hysteria in a digitized and globalized world based on economic principles. We discussed how the state and its size increase the likelihood of mass hysteria by comparing an idealized minimal state with an idealized welfare state, addressing a previously completely unexplored research question. Our findings are highly relevant and important because the policy failures induced by mass hysteria are potentially catastrophic for public health.
We found that the size and power of the state contributes positively to the likelihood and extensions of mass hysteria. The more centralized and the more power a state has, the higher the probability and extension of mass hysteria. In a minimal state, there exist self-correcting mechanisms that limit collective hysteria. The enforcement of private property rights limits the harm inflicted by those that succumb to the hysteria. The state (thanks to a fuzzy public sector and its soft power), by contrast, amplifies and exacerbates mass panics, potentially causing important havoc. What are temporarily, locally limited, isolated outbreaks of mass hysteria, the state may convert into a global mass hysteria for an extended period of time. Recent development in information technology and, particularly, the use of social media, as well as a decline of religion, have made societies more prone to the development of mass hysteria.
Unfortunately, once a mass hysteria takes hold of the government, the amount of damage the hysteria can inflict to life and liberty surges as the state’s respect for private property and basic human rights is limited. The violation of basic human rights in the form of curfews, lockdowns, and coercive closure of business has been amply illustrated during the COVID-19 crisis. Naturally, the COVID-19 example is indicative rather than representative and its lessons cannot be generalized. During the COVID-19 crisis, several authors have argued that from a public health point of view, these invasive interventions such as lockdowns have been unnecessary and, indeed, detrimental to overall public health. In fact, prior scientific research on disease mitigation measures during a possible influenza pandemic had warned against such invasive interventions and recommended a more normal social functioning.
Moreover, in reaction to past pandemics such as the Asian flu of 1957–1958, there were no lockdowns , and research before 2020 had opposed lockdowns. From this perspective, the lockdowns have been a policy error. We have shown that these policy errors may well have been produced by a collective hysteria. To which extent there has been a mass hysteria during the COVID-19 crisis is open for future research. In order to prevent the repetition of policy errors similar to those during the COVID-19 crisis, one should be aware of the political economy of mass hysteria developed in this article and the role of the state in fostering mass hysteria. Public health is likely to be affected negatively by state interventions during a mass hysteria due to policy errors.